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sidered in light of the following statement by Mr. Justice Burton
in Bute v. Illinois:60
While such federal court practice does not establish a constitutional
minimum standard of due process which must be observed in each
state under the Fourteenth Amendment ... [it] does afford an
example approved by the courts of the United States. It thus
contributes something toward establishing a general standard of
due process currently and properly applicable to the states under
the Fourteenth Amendment. 6'
Applying this strict standard of impartial selection through the
due process clause to criminal proceedings insures to a defendant
those procedures that are "so rooted in the traditions and con-
science of our people as to be ranked as fundamental. '0 2 The adop-
tion by all courts of this standard would do much to insure that all
people, regardless of class, receive the same treatment under the
same laws, an essential requirement of ordered liberty.
Established as the rules against discrimination are, violation of
these rules continues with alarming regularity. By adopting a rule
such as that applied by the Supreme Court to federal proceedings,
all convictions in which there was systematic exclusion of a race
or class contrary to statutory provisions would be subject to re-
versal. Under such circumstances a state would have no choice but
to eliminate discrimination or abolish trial by jury, the latter a
result which most state constitutions prohibit 3 and which public
conscience would not tolerate.
RALPH MALLOY MCKEITHEN
Contracts-Credit Cards-Liability of Holder for Unauthorized Use-
Issuer's and Merchants's Duty of Due Care in Accepting Charges
In The Diners' Club, Inc. v. Whited,' a California intermediate
appellate court discussed a problem on which there are few re-
-0 333 U.S. 640 (1948).
61 Id. at 659-60.
62 Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934).
E.g., N.C. CONST. art. I, § 13, which provides: "No person shall be
convicted of any crime but by the unanimous verdict of a jury of good and
lawful persons in open court." For a compilation of state constitutional
requirements as to the necessity of a jury trial in criminal proceedings, see
JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF SENIOR CIRCUIT JUDGES, REPORT OF THE COM-
MITTEE ON SELECTION OF JURORs 33-35 (1942).
'Civil No. A 10872, App. Dep't Cal., Aug. 6, 1964.
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ported cases: the liability of the holder of a credit card for the un-
authorized use of the card by another person.2 The usual three-
party credit card situation was present in Diners' Club. The issuer
furnished the card to the holder, and the merchants were to furnish
merchandise to the holder. Two contracts were involved: one be-
tween the issuer and the merchant, whereby the issuer agreed to
pay the merchant the amount of the holder's charges the merchant
accepted; and another between the issuer and the holder, in which
the holder agreed to repay the issuer and also to pay a small fee
for the privilege of using the card. The holder in Diners' Club
agreed' to the following liability provision, similar to provisions
used by most credit card issuers, printed on the back of his credit
card: "If this credit card is lost or stolen, original holder is liable
and responsible for all purchases charged through use of this card
until ... written notice [to the issuer] of its loss or theft."4
The holder's card was stolen while he was on vacation, and
charges of 1,622.99 dollars were made by the thief before the holder
For discussions of the problem, see Claflin, The Credit Card-A New
Instrument, 33 CONN. B.J. 1 (1959); Comment, The Tripartite Credit Card
Transaction: A Legal Infant, 48 CALIF. L. R v. 459 (1960); 12 DEPAUI L.
REv. 150 (1962); 9 KAN. L. Rxv. 325 (1960); 8 KAN. L. Rv. 554 (1959);
22 LA. L. REv. 640 (1962); 18 N.Y.U. INTRA. L. Ray. 47 (1962); 35 NOTRE
DAME LAW. 225 (1960) ; 13 STAN. L. REV. 150 (1960); 109 U. PA. L. REv.
266 (1960); Annot., 158 A.L.R. 754 (1945).
There was no question here of acceptance of the terms of the contract
by the holder. However, the problem has arisen in some cases as to whether
the holder has accepted the terms of his contract. The question is usually
one of consent, i.e., whether a reasonable person would have known that the
terms were a part of his contract. In the absence of actual consent to the
terms, it has been held, for example, that where the terms of an ex-
culpatory clause are on a separate instrument, or where the clause
is in cramped style, the contractual terms would not be binding. The
Minnetonka, 146 Fed. 509 (2d Cir. 1906) (cramped style); Anaconda
Copper Mining Co. v. Houston, 107 Ill. App. 183 (1903) (separate instru-
ment). For a more complete discussion of this problem, see 22 LA. L. REv.
640 (1962).
'Civil No. A 10872, App. Dep't Cal., Aug. 6, 1964. Other credit cards
have similar provisions. The Cities Service credit card provides: "Customer
named hereon agrees to pay all ... charges . . . and notify Company in
writing should card be lost or stolen." The customer's name and address
is on the card, but no signature is required. The Esso Standard Oil Com-
pany credit card has the following clause printed on its back: "The customer
assumes full responsibility for all purchases made by any person presenting
this credit card. The customer should promptly notify the issuing office in
writing if this card is stolen or lost and, if no such notification is received,
it shall be conclusively presumed that any holder of this credit card has the
customer's permission to use it." Again, the name of the customer is
printed on the face of the card, but no signature is necessary.
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discovered the theft and notified the issuer. The issuer brought
suit under the contract liability provision to require the holder to
pay for the unauthorized purchases made before written notice
was received by the issuer. The trial court held for the issuer, saying
the holder was absolutely bound by the liability provision.'
On appeal, the appellate court reversed, holding that although
the terms of the issuer-holder contract seemed to call for absolute
liability for all purchases made with the card before notice, the
issuer and the merchants nevertheless owed a duty of reasonable
care to see that "irregular charges . . . [were] not unnecessarily
incurred."' The court found that there had been an actual assign-
ment of the merchants' claims to the issuer and therefore held under
general assignment law that the holder could assert any defenses
against the issuer-assignee that he could assert against the merchant-
assignor.' However, the court indicated that the assignment was
not essential to the decision and that it would have reached the
same result in the absence of the actual assignment.' Also, the
court indicated that the showing of due care on the part of the
issuer and the merchants was part of the issuer's case0 and said
that the issuer had not carried this affirmative burden of proof."
The early cases that dealt with the liability of the holder for
unauthorized purchases involved two-party situations in which
credit was extended directly from an issuer-merchant to a holder,
and no liability clauses were present." In each case, the issuer
claimed that the holder should be liable for unauthorized pur-
chases regardless of the absence of a liability provision. A conflict
of authority on this question developed. A Pennsylvania case,
Wanamaker v. Megary,"2 used the novel approach of treating the
credit card that the imposter had taken from the holder as a ne-
gotiable instrument. Under this theory, the issuer-merchant be-
came a holder in due course when he accepted the charges and could
enforce the charges against the credit card holder, who was viewed
'Civil No. A 10872, App. Dep't Cal., Aug. 6, 1964.0Id. at 3.
7Ibid.
'Id. at 4.9 Ibid.
10 Ibid.
" Jones Store Co. v. Kelly, 225 Mo. App. 833, 36 S.W.2d 681 (1931);
Lit Bros. v. Haines,, 98 N.J.L. 658, 121 Atl. 131 (Sup. Ct. 1923); Wana-
maker v. Megary, 24 Pa. Dist. 778 (Munic. Ct. Phila. 1915).
1224 Pa. Dist. 778 (Munic. Ct. Phila. 1915).
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as an indorser of a note."3 Cases from other jurisdictions strongly
criticized this approach, 4 and a later Pennsylvania case expressly
disapproved it.'5 The other view was that because there was no
contractual obligation to pay for unauthorized charges, the holder
could not be liable.' All courts, however, completely ignored the
question of negligence and did not discuss whether due care should
be required of either party. Rather, the courts were concerned
solely with whether an absolute contractual obligation on the part
of the holder to pay for unauthorized charges should be implied.
The first three-party case also involved a contract in which
there was no liability clause. That case, Gulf Refining Co. v. Plot-
nik,'7 held for the first time that there was an implied obligation
on each party in the credit card arrangement to use due care.',
But the court said that in the absence of any negligence, the holder
would not be liable because there was no liability clause.' In Plotnik,
however, the holder was held liable because the unauthorized charges
had been incurred as a result of his negligence.2°
In an attempt to shift liability for unauthorized purchases to
the holder, the issuers began to include liability provisions, similar
to the clause in the Diners' Club contract, 21 in their issuer-holder
contracts. Thcse clauses have been present in all reported cases
since Plotnik. The courts in these cases have been faced with the
problem of whether the clauses, which seemingly called for abso-
lute liability for all purchases made with the card, should be strictly
construed against the holder. A conflict of authority has arisen
on this question also. One view says that the issuer, after paying the
charges to the merchant, becomes an assignee of the merchant and
1 Id. at 779.
"'Lit Bros. v. Haines, 98 N.J.L. 658, 121 AUt. 131 (Sup. Ct. 1923);
Union Oil Co. v. Lull, 220 Ore. 412, 349 P.2d 243 (1960).
"' Gulf Refining Co. v. Plotnik, 24 Pa. D. & C. 147 (C.P. 1935).
1Lit Bros. v. Haines, 98 N.J.L. 658, 121 Atl. 131 (Sup. Ct. 1923).
Accord, Jones Store Co. v. Kelly, 225 Mo. App. 833, 36 S.W.2d 681 (1931).
In Kelly there was an agency question, and the court held that even though
the holder would not be liable for unauthorized charges, he would be liable
if he had authorized the charges. 36 S.W.2d at 683.
" 24 Pa. D. & C. 147 (C.P. 1935).
18 Id. at 151.10Ibid.10The holder received bills for some of the charges incurred after his
card was stolen, but he did not pay them, and did not notify the issuer until
a few weeks later of the fact that his card had been stolen.
21 See text accompanying note 4 supra.
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that under general assignment law the holder can assert any defense
against the issuer that he can against the merchant." The courts
following this view hold that the issuer and the merchant are re-
quired to exercise due care in accepting credit charges.23 The same
courts have also regarded the holder as a guarantor, 4 one court
saying that the situation could be classified as one of "suretyship,
guaranty, or indemnity" 25 and that "it is immaterial which of these
terms would most accurately describe the relationship .... The
imposter who makes the unauthorized purchases is regarded as the
principal debtor, the merchants and the issuer are treated as the
creditors, and the holder is treated as a gratuitous guarantor, a
favorite of the law. Therefore, "it is necessarily implied from
this broad guaranty that the person extending credit [the merchant]
must do so in good faith .... 27 Thus, before Diners' Club, some
courts required due care by all parties to the credit card arrange-
ment, saying that an assignment or guaranty situation existed.
The other view is that the holder owes a direct contractual obli-
gation to the issuer to pay for all purchases made with his card.
Under this view, the contractual provision is decisive of liability,
and negligence on the part of the merchant in accepting charges is
unimportant. One case expounding this view is Texaco, Inc. v.
Goldstein.2 s The holder was held liable for all purchases made with
his card because of the terms of the liability clause of the issuer-
holder contract,2 9 which were "that of an original undertaking in
which the... [holder] made it his own responsibility for any use
" Gulf Refining Co. v. Williams Roofing Co., 208 Ark. 362, 186 S.W.2d
790 (1945) ; Union Oil Co. v. Lull, 220 Ore. 412, 349 P.2d 243 (1960). The
card in Union Oil provided: "The customer . . . guarantees payment ...
of price of products delivered or services rendered by anyone presenting
this card . . . until card is surrendered or written notice is received by the
company that it is lost or stolen." Id. at 416, 349 P.2d at 245.
.8 See cases cited note 22 supra.
" See cases cited note 22 supra.
2 Union Oil Co. v. Lull, 220 Ore. 412, 425, 349 P.2d 243, 249 (1960).
26Ibid.
22 Gulf Refining Co. v. Williams Roofing Co., 208 Ark. 362, 369, 186
S.W.2d 790, 794 (1945).
2834 Misc. 2d 751, 229 N.Y.S.2d 51 (1962).
The Texaco card provided: "the person . . . whose name is embossed
on the reverse side thereof ... assumes full responsibility for all purchases
made hereunder by any one through the use of this credit card prior to sur-
rendering it to the company or to giving the company notice in writing that
the card has been lost or stolen." 229 N.Y.S.2d at 53.
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of the card."30 The court said that they so held because there would
be an impairment of the credit card system if a "high duty of
diligence" was required of issuers and merchants."' The court in
Texaco distinguished the cases in which the holder was treated as
a guarantor because the word "guaranty," present in the issuer-
holder contracts in those cases, was absent from the Texaco card.
Therefore, said the court, good faith on the part of the issuers
and the merchants in accepting charges, implicit in the guaranty
situation, was not required under the Texaco contract.32 The court,
however, did not discuss the fact that the courts in the cases it
distinguished did not rely on the guaranty theory alone, but rather
would have reached the same result on the assignment theory.
Diners' Club, which rejected the Texaco approach, makes sig-
nificant additions to the growing body of credit card law. Although
the court approved the decisions requiring due care of issuers and
merchants on assignment and guaranty theories and found an actual
assignment, it indicated that it would have reached the same result
in the absence of the assignment. Thus, Diners' Club implies that
the issuer and the merchant have to use due care in accepting credit
card charges regardless of the contractual provisions and regardless
of whether there is present a guaranty or assignment situation.
If due care is used by the issuers and merchants, the holder will be
held liable under the contractual liability provision in the issuer-
holder contract.
The case is also significant because the court indicated that it
followed the rule, announced in Union Oil Co. v. Lull,3 that the
issuer suing a holder on the liability provision has the burden of
proving that both it and the merchant involved used due care in
30 Id. at 54.
" Id. at 55. Another case which seems to hold the same way is Magnolia
Petroleum Co. v. McMillan, 168 S.W.2d 881 (Tex. Civ. App. 1943). The
Magnolia credit card provided that the "holder shall be responsible for all
purchases made by use of this card .. .whether or not such purchases are
made by the named holder . . . ." Ibid. The court seemed to hold that be-
cause of the terms of the issuer-holder contract, the holder was absolutely
liable for all purchases made with his card. The only defense the holder
had set up was that the charges had been made by an unauthorized person,
and the court held that this was not a valid defense; however, it was not
made clear from the decision whether there were other defenses which the
holder could have asserted.
82229 N.Y.S.2d at 54.
" 220 Ore. 412, 349 P.2d 243 (1960).
1965]
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accepting the charges. Lull has been criticized by one commentator,"4
who expressed fear that this requirement usually will result in the
issuer losing the case. This criticism is based on the fact that it
will often be impossible for the merchant to recall all his actions,
even if due care was in fact used, and also on the fact that costs in
locating the necessary witnesses and taking depositions will often
be prohibitive. 35 Granting that this rule may often be harsh on the
issuer, it would be even harsher to put this burden of proof on the
holder. The holder is not present when the charges are incurred,
and unlike the issuer, it would be impossible in most instances
for him to prove that due care was not used. The issuer can
require the merchants to develop methods of recording the details
of each transaction and also require them to develop a uniform
system of checking all charges. By following such a system, the
issuer can prevent many unauthorized charges and also more easily
meet his burden of proof.
The court in Diners' Club did not decide the question, raised in
the holder's brief,"0 of whether the holder would ever be liable in
the case of a forgery. A forgery occurs under the Diners' Club
contract when someone other than the authorized holder uses the
card. This is because the person making purchases must sign his
name to a sales slip, and a contractual provision in the issuer-holder
contract (incorporated by reference) provides: "The Credit Card
is not transferable and will be honored only when properly signed and
presented by the authorized holder."3 7 The reason the possibility
existed that the holder would never be liable in the case of a forgery
was because of an ambiguity between this clause and the issuer-
holder provision which seemingly called for absolute liability
for all unauthorized purchases. Obviously, when an imposter pre-
sents the card he is not an "authorized holder," and under this
provision the card should not be honored. Thus, the two contractual
provisions present the anomalous situation in which unauthorized
charges are not to be accepted, but if they are, the holder is abso-
lutely responsible for them. The holder urged that because of the
3,109 U. PA. L. REV. 266, 268 (1960).
3 Ibid.
35 Brief for Defendant-Appellant, p. 12, Diners' Club v. Whited, Civil No.
A 10872, App. Dep't Cal., Aug. 6, 1964.
87 Civil No. A 10872, App. Dep't Cal., Aug. 6, 1964, at 2. (Emphasis
added.)
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uncertainty of these contradictory provisions, the ambiguity should
be resolved against the issuer and the holder should never be liable
for unauthorized purchases. 8 The court did not reach this problem
because there were other grounds on which to base the decision, but
it was indicated that "there is much merit to this argument . . .,39
However, it was also pointed out that this problem is not one of
general interest because "it can be avoided easily by properly draft-
ing the contract,"40 as has been done in some oil company contracts
where the card is not signed by the holder and is not restricted to
the holder's use.41
If the court had been faced only with the liability question in
Diners' Club, the case would have been reversed and remanded so as
to give the issuer an opportunity to allege and prove the use of due
care in accepting the unauthorized charges. However, the court
found that because of the terms of the issuer-merchant contract, the
issuer could never prove damages. The court pointed out that the
difficulty arose because the issuer-merchant contract was not worded
the same as the issuer-holder contract.42 The issuer-holder con-
tract provided that the holder was to pay the issuer for any charges
incurred with the holder's card. The issuer-merchant contract, how-
ever, provided that the issuer undertook "to purchase ... all valid
charges . .. " and that in order to be a valid charge "the signature
of the cardholder . . . must be the same as that appearing on the
face of the card."44 It is obvious that the charges accepted by the
merchants from the thief, whose signature was not the same as
the one appearing on the card, were not valid charges. Therefore,
when the issuer purchased the charges which were the basis of this
suit, it made the payments voluntarily "to promote its own good
will among merchants."45 The court said that such a "voluntary
payment is not damage."48 This decision will obviously result in
more careful draftsmanship of the issuer-merchants contracts in
the future, with the issuers being careful to provide that their pay-
ments to the merchants are not "voluntary."
38Id. at 4.
8° Id. at 4-5.
'old. at 5.
"' Ibid.
'2 Ibid.
Id. at 2. (Emphasis added.)
"Ibid.
"Id. at 6.
"Ibid.
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Because of the great amount of business done with credit cards,
it is vital that there be some definitive solution to the problem of
which of the two parties, the issuer or the holder, should be held
responsible for unauthorized purchases made with credit cards. It
appears that the result reached in Diners' Club is the fairest. If
neither the issuer, holder, nor merchant has been negligent, and if
the parties have used due care in carrying out their various duties,
or if only the holder has been negligent, the contractual liability
clause between the issuer and the holder should be given full force
and the holder should be liable for the unauthorized purchases.
However, as between the holder and the issuer, the issuer is
better in a position to prevent unauthorized charges. Therefore,
if the issuer or merchant has been negligent in accepting charges,
the issuer and not the holder should be the one to suffer. To
hold otherwise would be to encourage lax practices among the
merchants, for the merchants' examination of credit cards would
become even more perfunctory than at present if they knew they
would be repaid regardless of whether the charges were authorized.
Requiring due care by all parties in the three-party credit card sit-
uat-ion is the most equitable solution to the problem.
HOWARD S. IRVIN
Criminal Law-Statutory Rape-Mistake of Age-Me'ns Rea
Prior to People v. Hernandez,' all American jurisdictions faced
with an ignorance or mistake of age plea in statutory rape cases
have held it not to be a valid defense.' Upon facts showing that the
defendant and the prosecutrix were not married, that the prosecutrix
was under the statutory age of eighteen,3 and that the prosecutrix
139 Cal. Rptr. 361, 393 P.2d 673 (Cal. 1964).
' Ignorance of age is no defense even though based on a good faith
belief that the female was above the prohibited age. Commonwealth v.
Murphy, 165 Mass. 66, 42 N.E. 504 (1895); State v. Houx, 109 Mo. 654,
19 S.W. 35 (1892). This is true even where there has been an exercise
of reasonable care to ascertain her age. Manning v. State, 43 Tex. Crim.
302, 65 S.W. 920 (1901). It is also true where the defendant was misled
by her appearance or her misrepresentations. Brown v. State, 23 Del. 159,
74 Atl. 836 (7 Penn. 1909); Heath v. State, 173 Ind. 296, 90 N.E. 310
(1910); Harris v. State, 115 Tex. Crim. 227, 28 S.W.2d 813 (1930).
See generally 1 WHARTON, CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE § 241 (12th
ed. 1952).
' CAL. PENAL CODE § 261.
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